This paper constructs a dataset on cross-border assets and liabilities for a group of 18 countries, including both developed and emerging economies. The data covers the years 1980 to 2005 and distinguishes between four asset classes: FDI, equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves. A number of stylized facts emerge from the dataset. In particular, the ndings indicate that bilateral nancial linkages are organized in three tiers of nancial centres. The rst tier is composed of the US, the UK, Singapore, and Hong Kong; the second of Japan, France, Germany, Australia and Canada; with the third composed of the remaining countries. This contrasts with the pattern of bilateral trade, which is predominantly intra-continental and is organized in three clusters: a European cluster (centred on Germany), an Asian cluster (centred on China), and an American cluster (centred on the US).
Summary
This paper contributes to the understanding of nancial globalization by building a dataset of bilateral nancial positions for 18 countries, including both developed economies and EMEs.
The data distinguishes between four asset classes: FDI, portfolio equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves. For the rst three asset classes, missing data is constructed using gravity models, which have been extensively applied to explain cross-border trade and have been increasingly used to explain nancial stocks and ows. The models perform quite well and explain almost 70 percent of the variation in cross-border asset weights. For reserves, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we collect data on the currency composition, using data from the BIS and lling in the gaps using the estimation results in Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) . Then, we translate currency into geographical composition.
A number of interesting ndings emerge from the data. Looking at the ratio of assets plus liabilities to GDP, there has been a remarkable increase in the size of nancial positions since 1985, most rapidly since 1995. Financial linkages are organized in three tiers of nancial centres.
The rst tier is composed of the US, the UK, Singapore, and Hong Kong; the second of Japan, France, Germany, Australia and Canada; with the third composed of the remaining countries.
This contrasts with the pattern of bilateral trade, which is predominantly intra-continental and is organized in three clusters: a European cluster (centred on Germany), an Asian cluster (centred on China), and an American cluster (centred on the US).
This data can be used to analyse a number of interesting questions. For example, it can be used to examine how nancial linkages affect the size of cross-border spillovers. Other possible applications include an analysis of whether EMEs have decoupled from advanced economies and whether business cycles in the G7 have become more synchronized.
Working Paper No. ? ? 20081 Introduction
Financial globalization is one of the most striking phenomena happening in the world economy since the mid-1990s. Until recently, very little was known about the size and composition of countries' external nancial assets and liabilities. This gap was partly narrowed by the work of Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) , which provides estimates of the total external nancial assets and liabilities of 145 countries, from 1970 to 2004. However, very little is known about their geographical composition. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the geographical composition of countries' external positions by constructing a dataset of bilateral assets and liabilities for a group of 18 countries, covering the period from 1980 to 2005. This dataset can be used for a number of interesting applications. First, it allows a richer characterization of the recent phenomenon of nancial globalization. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) show that there has been a market increase in the ratio of foreign assets plus liabilities to GDP, particularly since the mid-1990s. This increase has been especially pronounced among industrial countries, where nancial integration has exceeded trade integration. The data presented here allows an analysis of which countries have become more interlinked during the process of nancial globalization.
Second, the dataset can be used to shed light on the question of whether business cycles among developed countries have become more synchronized. This is particularly important to understand how countries may be affected by uctuations in the rest of the world. The consensus in the literature is that business cycle co-movement among developed countries rose sharply after the collapse of Bretton Woods and remained high since then. However, while in the 1970s and early 1980s co-movement was mainly due to common shocks, the key drivers from the late 1980s onwards are likely to have been spillovers of country-speci c shocks through trade and nancial links. A robust nding in the empirical literature is that pairs of countries that trade more with each other exhibit a higher degree of output comovement (e.g. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) ).
Our dataset allows this type of exercise to be done taking into account nancial links.
Related to this debate, there has been an increased interest in the past year or so on whether GDP growth in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) has decoupled and thus become more resilient to the ongoing cyclical downturn in advanced economies. Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2008) look at this question by decomposing output, investment and consumption uctuations in a group of 106 countries into four factors: a global factor, three group speci c factors (for industrial countries, emerging markets, and developing countries), country factors, and idiosyncratic factors speci c to each time series. They nd that during the period of globalization there has been an increase in business cycle convergence within the group of industrial countries and within the group of EMEs, but there has been divergence (or decoupling) between them. However, in a short chapter on this subject, Claessens and Kose (2008) make an important quali cation. They note that the existing evidence in favour of the decoupling hypothesis has mainly focused on real economic linkages, but has left out nancial linkages. Therefore, the evidence does not speak to the possibility of nancial decoupling (or lack thereof). This is another area where our dataset could lead to important contributions.
Finally, the dataset can be applied to another heated policy debate -the reform of IMF surveillance. The IMF has been under a gradual reform process for several years. An important aspect of this process is the shift in the perspective of surveillance from the country level to a multilateral level, taking into account cross-border spillovers. Having a better understanding of which countries are more closely linked by spillovers is an important step in the development of a framework for multilateral surveillance. By understanding these linkages, the IMF could highlight how a particular country may be affected by developments in other countries and how its policies may generate spillovers to the rest of the world. Our dataset can be used to measure the impact of nancial linkages on the magnitude of cross-country spillovers and form groups of countries closely linked by spillovers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the construction of the dataset, distinguishing between asset classes: FDI, equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves. Section 3 presents some ndings that emerge from the data, comparing cross-country links based on trade with those based on nancial positions. It uses network diagrams to visualize which countries are more linked and how those links have evolved over time. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Framework

General Approach for FDI, Equity, and Debt
The data is constructed at annual frequency and includes 18 countries at different stages of development and located in different continents. The data is disaggregated in four asset classes: FDI, equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves.
The methodology used to construct the data is somewhat different for each asset class. For the rst three asset classes, missing data is estimated using gravity models, which have been used extensively in the trade literature. These models explain bilateral asset weights using a variety of variables, including standard gravity variables, such as distance, common language, common border, time difference, and colonial links; and additional regressors, such as bilateral trade, and exchange rate volatility. For foreign exchange reserves, we start by estimating their currency composition and then transform it into geographical composition. Because data on the currency composition of reserves is con dential, we base our estimations on the results reported in previous studies which had access to such con dential data.
Since the construction of data for FDI, equity, and debt follows a similar approach, it is useful to describe the general approach before discussing the elements that are speci c to each asset class.
The construction of data for these three asset classes follows a seven-steps procedure:
Step 1. Collect available data on bilateral assets from a variety of sources.
The data sources are discussed in more detail in the next sections.
Step 2. Compute geographical weights.
By dividing the assets of country i in country j (X i jt ) by the total assets of country i (X it ), we obtain the percentage of assets of country i which are held in country j (w i jt ):
X it where total assets are obtained from the same sources as bilateral assets.
Weights do not necessarily add up to 100, since the 18 countries in the sample do not account for a country's total foreign assets. For example, for UK FDI, the sum of the weights is approximately 70% in the 1980s, but falls to about 40% in the 2000s. Among the countries excluded from our sample, the one that accounts for a larger share of UK FDI assets is the Netherlands, which has an offshore nancial centre (the Netherlands Antilles). The share of UK FDI assets in the Netherlands has been increasing, especially since the 1990s: it was only Working Paper No. ? ? 2008 7% in 1990 and increased to above 25% in 2003 1 . Because offshore nancial centres operate mostly as intermediaries rather than as nal destination for investment, there is no large loss from not including them in the sample. As long as the geographical allocation of the assets invested through these nancial centres resembles the geographical allocation of the assets invested directly, our analysis provides an accurate description of bilateral nancial linkages.
Step 3. Estimation of gravity models for geographical weights.
Missing data is estimated using gravity models, which are the workhorse models for trade in goods. They explain trade ows between countries i and j using a variety of variables, such as distance, common language, common border, colonial links, etc. More recently, they have been applied to explain asset ows and stocks, and have been found to perform quite well, typically explaining more than 70% of the variation in cross border ows and stocks of foreign assets. For example, Portes and Rey (2005) use a gravity model to explain cross-border equity ows and conclude that it performs at least as well as when used to explain trade in goods.
The idea that variables such as distance and cultural af nities may explain a large proportion of cross border asset ows and stocks might be surprising. Unlike goods, assets are not subject to transportation costs. Also, if investors want to diversify their portfolios, they might choose to invest in more distant countries, if their business cycles have a low or negative correlation with their own country's business cycle. The fact that gravity variables perform at least as well in explaining nancial positions as in explaining goods trade suggests that nancial markets are not frictionless, but are segmented by information asymmetries and familiarity effects.
We use the following speci cation for the gravity models:
log.
This is estimated separately for each asset class: FDI, equity, and debt. w i jt is the proportion of assets of country i held in country j in year t. The dependent variable is the logit of weights. This is a standard transformation to deal with proportions data, transforming (1) into a linear model which can be estimated by OLS (Greene (1997) ). The downside of this transformation is that taking logs eliminates observations for which the weights are zero.
However, given the small proportion of zeros in the data (less than 10%), eliminating them
should not have much in uence on the results.
i and j are dummy variables for each source and host country and t are time dummies. The host country xed effects control for characteristics that explain why some countries are more attractive to foreign investors than others. The source country xed effects control for 1 These numbers are from UNCTAD (2005). characteristics that explain why some countries invest larger shares abroad than others. In addition to these xed effects, we include a set of bilateral variables, X i j , which are standard in trade gravity models and measure the geographic and historical proximity between economies: common border, common language, colonial links, distance, and time difference. The colony dummy is asymmetric and is equal to 1 if country i is a former colonizer of country j. We construct this variable asymmetrically to re ect the fact that while former colonizers may have preferential status when they invest in former colonies, former colonies may not have preferential status when investing in former colonizers. The time difference between countries i and j is included as a measure of information asymmetry and transaction costs. It has been found to be signi cant in previous studies (Daude and Stein (2007) ). Z i jt is a set of time varying regressors.
Step 4. Combine`actual' with estimated weights.
After estimating gravity models for geographical weights, we use the estimated coef cients to obtain out of sample predictions of weights for those years and country pairs for which data is missing. We then combine the`actual' weights with those predicted values to obtain a dataset on asset weights with no missing observations.
Step 5. Rescaling.
In this step, we rescale the weights obtained in step 4 so that the weights in our sample add up to 100%. The reason why we do this is to eliminate some of the discontinuities introduced by the estimation. Even though the gravity models explain a large fraction of the variation in the data (with R-squareds of almost 70%), in some cases there is a large discontinuity between actual and estimated weights. An example of this is data on portfolio equity assets for Argentina. In 2001, when actual data from the CPIS is available, the sum of the weights accounted for by our sample of 18 countries is 99%. However, the sum of the estimated weights in 2000 is only 10%. The gravity model is clearly underestimating the weights for Argentina's equity assets. This is an extreme example and the problem does not arise for most countries in the sample. Also, since the model is tted to the cross-country average, there will naturally be some countries for which the t is not as good. In any case, we decided to rescale all weights to 100% to get around these discontinuities. We denote the rescaled weights by
In doing this, we are implicitly assuming that the countries in our sample are only connected among themselves and ignore linkages with countries that are not in the sample. This is clearly a very simplistic assumption. However, the countries in our sample accounted for about 83% of the world's total equities, bonds, and bank assets in 2006 2 . This is a large proportion. Most of the remainder is accounted for by offshore nancial centres. However, since these nancial centres are typically not the nal destinations of investment, we do not lose much by excluding them. To the extent that the geographical allocation of assets through these nancial centres is similar to the direct geographical allocation, our methodology will produce accurate measures of bilateral nancial linkages.
Step 6 Multiply geographical weights by total assets from the Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2007) dataset to obtain stocks of foreign assets.
To transform geographical weights into stocks of foreign assets, we multiply the weights obtained in step 5 by the total assets of country i reported in the Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007) dataset:
Step 7 (symmetry). Construct liabilities from assets.
The data is constructed taking the assets perspective. This is because gravity models are more suitable to estimate assets than to estimate liabilities. When deciding their portfolio allocation, investors take into account a variety of variables (proximity, returns, trade, etc.) which are used as regressors in the gravity model. The last step in the data construction explores the fact that assets and liabilities should be symmetric and constructs liabilities from assets:
Liabilities of country i with country j at year t equal assets of country j in country i at year t.
FDI
Data
The main source of data on FDI assets is the OECD International Direct Investment by Country database. This contains FDI data at book value reported by OECD members, starting in 1981.
There are many missing values in the data. To the extent possible, missing observations are lled in with data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The two datasets do not report exactly the same numbers when the data overlap, but the discrepancy is not large and they are broadly consistent. Even after combining the datasets, there are still important gaps in the data, with no observations for FDI assets of Argentina and Mexico 3 .
Missing data accounts for approximately 44% of the sample.
There is a large degree of imprecision in FDI data, which is clear from the large asymmetry between reported assets and liabilities. This suggests that we should work with data on FDI liabilities, since it is a more comprehensive measure of bilateral linkages, including investment channeled through a third country. To transform liabilities into assets, we would use country j's reported liabilities with country i as being equal to country i's assets in country j. The problem with this approach is that our estimation procedure focuses on bilateral weights rather than levels. To compute weights, we need to divide bilateral assets by total assets. In order to construct total assets of country i from the liabilities reported by the recipient countries, we would need to know the liabilities of all recipient countries with country i. Because this information is not available for all countries, we cannot follow this approach. Therefore, we compute weights by dividing country i's reported bilateral assets by country i's reported total assets and make no use of data on liabilities.
With this approach, we only capture direct linkages and exclude investment channeled through third countries. While this is a limitation, it is worth noting that our sample does not include offshore nancial centres, which play an important role in intermediating capital ows. This minimizes the loss introduced by ignoring indirect linkages. Also, since we are focusing on bilateral asset weights, the implicit assumption we make is that the geographical allocation of indirect linkages mirrors the geographical allocation of direct linkages. For example, we assume that the share of Chinese assets allocated to Hong Kong through Taiwan matches the share of Chinese assets allocated directly to Hong Kong. We believe this is a reasonable assumption. Indicators. It is measured at constant prices and is PPP-adjusted. The degree of openness of country j to inward FDI is measured as a time varying index. For most countries, it is constructed from the tables in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) , which report the chronology of stock market liberalization and classify countries into three degrees of liberalization over time:
Estimation
No liberalization: foreign investors are not allowed to hold domestic equity and cannot repatriate capital, dividends, and interest before ve years of the initial investment.
Partial liberalization: the country is open to foreign investment, but with restriction
Full liberalization: foreign investors are allowed to hold domestic equity and to repatriate capital, dividends and interest without restrictions.
We transform this classi cation into a numerical variable which takes the value 0 if country j is not liberalized in year t, 1 if it is partially liberalized, and 2 if it is fully liberalized.
Some of the countries in our sample are not studied by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) . For those countries, we use information on the timing of stock market liberalization from other studies and code it according to the criteria used by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) . For China, we use information in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundbland (2007) , Prasad and Wei (2005) and OECD (2000), and for India, we use Ahluwalia (2002) and Reserve Bank of India (2006). Table   2 reports the index on liberalization to FDI investment for those countries that were not fully liberalized throughout the whole period.
As well as being used as a control in regression (1), this index is used to ll in some of the missing data prior to estimation. have been no inward ows to China during the period 1980 to 1990, the stock of assets in that period should equal the stock in 1991 adjusted for valuation effects due to changes in exchange rates and asset prices. To adjust for valuation effects, we assume that the bilateral stocks of the UK in China in the period from 1980 to 1990 grow at the same rate as total Chinese FDI liabilities. Therefore, we take the value is 1991 as the starting point and build stocks backwards using the growth rate of total Chinese liabilities, computed using UNCTAD data.
Turning to the estimation results, we might expect the host country xed effects to account for most of the explanatory power in regression (1). To study this, we estimate a model where FDI asset weights are only explained by the host country xed effects. The results are reported in column (1) of Table 4 . The predictive power is not negligible, with an R 2 of 41%. Column (2) adds source host country xed effects, with an improvement in the R 2 to 50%. This suggests that some source countries are more diversi ed than others, investing a smaller share in a larger number of countries. Including bilateral variables further increases the R 2 to 68%, which is remarkably high and is consistent with the results found in other empirical studies. We also experimented with additional controls. One variable which has been found in previous studies to have a signi cant effect on bilateral asset holdings is bilateral trade. There are at least two reasons why this may be the case. First, bilateral trade may capture an additional familiarity effect, over and above the gravity variables. Second, countries may use nancial investment to hedge against shocks in countries with which they trade. For example, if country A imports from country B, a potential hedge against output shocks in country B is to hold equity in that country:
an increase in the domestic demand for imports from country B would be compensated by higher dividend yields from holding equity in country B. We extended the model to include trade weights, measured as the ratio of trade between countries i and j (exports plus imports), over total trade of country i, using data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Trade weights were found to have an insigni cant effect in explaining FDI weights and were not included in the model used for prediction.
Another variable we experimented with was the volatility in bilateral exchange rates, measured as the standard deviation in the rate of change of monthly bilateral exchange rates on a three-year rolling window. Exchange rates were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). This is a common explanatory variable in gravity models for nancial stocks and ows.
The idea is that bilateral investment may be smaller when the bilateral exchange rate is more volatile, since there is more uncertainty about the returns. This variable turned out to have an insigni cant effect on FDI asset weights, which is consistent with previous studies 4 .
Equity
Data
Data on portfolio equity assets is collected from the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), which covers all countries in our sample except China, who did not participate in the survey. The time coverage though is quite limited: a pilot survey was conducted in 1997 and a regular annual survey was introduced in 2001 for an extended group of participating countries.
Given this limited data availability, 69% of the data is missing and needs to be estimated. Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (1) on equity weights. The host country xed effects only explain 46% of the variation in equity weights. Introducing source country xed effects increases the R 2 to 55%, indicating that some source countries are more diversi ed and invest smaller shares in a larger number of destinations. The bilateral variables, X i j , are the same as in the regression for FDI weights. They are all signi cant and have the expected signs except for the indicator for colonial links, which turns out negative. This suggests that investors may prefer to invest in countries with a similar degree of development as their home country, regardless of historical colonial links. The inclusion of these bilateral variables leads to a signi cant improvement in the R 2 , which rises to 71%.
Estimation
The set of time varying controls, Z i jt , includes GDP per capita in country j, bilateral exchange rate volatility, and the degree of openness of country j to inward equity investment. GDP per capital in country i and the stock market capitalization in country j turned out to be insigni cant.
The results suggest that investors invest more in countries that are more open to inward equity investment and have a larger GDP per capita. They also invest more when the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate is smaller. However, these time varying variables do not have a large explanatory power and lead to a very small improvement in the R 2 .
We experimented with other variables to capture stock market returns and correlation in returns (averages, standard deviations, and correlation coef cient of daily MSCI indices in the host and source countries). These variables were insigni cant and therefore were not included in the nal regressions. Trade weights also turned out insigni cant, as in the regression for FDI.
The degree of openness of country j to equity investment was constructed in the same way as the one for FDI. In fact, FDI can be seen as a type of portfolio equity investment where the degree of ownership exceeds 10% of the rm's equity. However, countries may liberalize their stock markets to foreign portfolio equity investment and remain closed to FDI by introducing a ceiling on the percentage of total equity that can be owned by foreign residents. While this may be true for other countries, the only country in our sample where the index of liberalization to equity investment differs from the one for FDI is Korea, where foreign portfolio equity investment was partially liberalized in 1991, while foreign FDI investment remained restricted. Both types of investment were then fully liberalized in 1998. For all other countries, the liberalization index for equity coincides with the index for FDI reported in Table 2 .
As for FDI, the liberalization index for equity is used to estimate missing data. However, while for FDI it was possible to take a data point when the host country was still closed as build the data backwards using the growth rate of its total liabilities -as illustrated in Table 3 -for equity the data starts when all countries were already open to inward equity investment. Since it is not possible to build the data backwards in the same way as for FDI, we simply impose zero bilateral weights for the period when the host country was closed to inward equity investment. The only exception to this rule is equity investment of Hong Kong in China. China was closed to inward equity investment until 1992. However, given the strong political and administrative links between the two countries, we do not impose zeros for Hong Kong's equity investment in China pre 1992.
Debt
Data
Data on portfolio debt assets is also collected from the IMF CPIS. Given its limited time coverage, we combine it with data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, which reports debt assets and liabilities of banks for all countries in our sample, except Argentina, China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. The BIS data has the advantage of having a much longer time coverage, going back to 1977 for most advanced countries. However, it has the limitation of only reporting debt assets held by banks, while the CPIS has a broader coverage, including not only banks but also other nancial institutions, monetary authorities, the government, non-nancial corporations, and households. Another difference between the two datasets is that, while the CPIS only covers portfolio debt, the BIS also covers loans and deposits.
When combining data on debt asset weights from the CPIS and the BIS we are implicitly assuming that assets held by banks have a similar geographical distribution as portfolio debt.
This may not be the case, since it is plausible that portfolio debt is less affected by proximity variables than other types of debt (such as loans and deposits). Treasury bonds, in particular, can be seen as relatively homogeneous products. Therefore, it is plausible that those assets require less information intensity than other types of debt instruments and respond less to proximity variables. To test whether it is sensible to combine the BIS and CPIS data, we computed the correlation coef cient between the asset weights generated by the two data sources, which turns out to be quite large (80%). By default, we use asset weights computed from the BIS data, and complete it with weights computed from the CPIS data whenever possible. After combining the two datasets, approximately 43% of the data is missing. The gaps are especially pronounced for China, for which there is no data, and the other countries not covered by the BIS Locational
Banking Statistics, for which we only have data after the CPIS was introduced.
Estimation
For FDI and equity, it is reasonable to assume that assets are denominated in the currency of the host country. For debt, however, this equivalence between currency and geographical composition is not so simple, since countries may issue bonds denominated in foreign currencies.
Therefore, investors make a simultaneous decision about the geographical as well as the currency composition of their debt investments. This introduces a further complication, since we should model these two choices simultaneously. Here, we simplify by focusing only on the geographical composition of debt and abstracting from its currency composition. Table 6 reports the results of estimating model (1) on debt weights. The model including only host country xed effects explains 49% of the variation in debt weights. Including source country xed effects increases the R 2 to 57%. The bilateral variables exclude border, which came insigni cant in the estimation. The colony dummy has a negative sign, as in the model for equity.
This is an interesting nding and suggests that, for types of investment which imply a larger degree of commitment, such as FDI, former colonizers tend to invest in former colonies.
However, for equity and debt investment, they seem to prefer to invest in countries with a similar degree of development, regardless of colonial links. The inclusion of the bilateral variables improves the R 2 signi cantly to 69%.
Unlike in the models used for FDI and equity, the set of time varying controls, Z i jt , does not include the degree of liberalization of the host country to inward debt investment. This is because we were unable to construct an index which captures restrictions only to inward investment. The closest measure we were able to nd was a time series index for capital account restrictions, based on the chronology in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) . This index captures restrictions to borrowing abroad by banks and corporations (which could be interpreted as restrictions to debt capital in ows) as well as exchange rates and other restrictions to capital out ows. Because it confounds restrictions to inward and outward investment, we decided not to use it.
As for equity, the results suggest that investors tend to invest larger shares in more developed countries and in countries with lower exchange rate volatility with respect to the currency of the source country. In contrast with the result for FDI and equity though, bilateral trade weights have a signi cant and positive effect on debt weights. This result is consistent with the ndings in Rose and Spiegel (2004) . In their paper borrowers fear that defaulting on their debt may lead to a reduction in international trade. Therefore, countries systematically lend more to countries with which they have closer trade links.
We experimented with including bond market capitalization and measures of bond returns, using the JP Morgan EMBI and Global Bond Index (GBI). These variables turned out insigni cant and were not included in the model used for prediction.
Reserves
The construction of the reserves data follows a different approach from the one used for the other three asset classes. While for FDI, equity and debt, investors choose where to invest, for reserves they choose in which currency to invest. Therefore we follow a two step procedure. First, we obtain the currency composition of reserves. Then, we transform currency into geographical composition: if country i holds an amount X of reserves in US dollars, we take X as being the amount of reserve assets that country i holds in the US. For simpli cation, we focus on four main reserve currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the pound, and the yen. These should capture the bulk of countries' foreign exchange reserves. Also for simpli cation, we treat reserves of country i denominated in euros as being assets of country i in Germany. For the period before the introduction of the euro, we use the deutsche mark 5 .
An important limitation in constructing data on the currency composition of reserves is that, given its con dentiality, data is not readily available. The BIS Multilateral Surveillance Statistics contain data on the currency composition of reserves for the countries in the G10 since 1994.
This gives us data for six counties in our sample: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and US.
Given the remarkable stability of currency weights over time, we assume that weights stay constant from 1980 to 1994. For the remaining countries, the IMF collects data in the COFER database. Although the numbers are only released as aggregates across industrialized and developing countries, disaggregated data has been used in studies by IMF authors. We use the results reported in those studies to obtain estimates of the currency composition of reserves for the countries in our sample that are not members of the G10.
The studies we use are Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) and Dooley et al (1989) . These papers use the following speci cation to explain the currency composition of reserves:
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The dependent variable is the share of foreign exchange reserves held by country i in currency c at time t, obtained from COFER. The regression includes a constant term, dummy variables equal to 1 if country i pegs to the US dollar or to another currency, the share of trade between country i and country j at time t (where country j is the country that issues currency c), and the share of debt service payments of country i in currency c at time t. The share of trade is calculated as the sum of exports and imports between countries i and j divided by total exports 5 A more precise way of dealing with euro reserves would be to allocate them according to the relative GDP of each country in the euro area. Here we take a shortcut and allocate all euro reserves to Germany.
plus imports plus debt service payments of country i. The share of debt payments in currency c is calculated as service payments of country i on debt denominated in currency c divided by total exports plus imports plus debt service payments of country i. (2000) This approach gives us estimates of the currency composition of reserves which seem sensible.
Eichengreen and Mathieson
While it is dif cult to have a benchmark for comparison, countries occasionally report their reserve shares in announcements and media interviews. For example, China is reported to hold roughly 70% of dollar reserves, 20% in euros and 10% in other currencies. Our estimation gives 79% in dollars and 21% in euros.
A Look at the Data
To give a avour of the dataset, we use network diagrams to show the key stylized facts that emerge from the data. First, we look at the time evolution of nancial asset weights, which exhibits remarkable stability. We then focus on the time evolution of the level of nancial assets 
To simplify the diagrams, we impose a cutoff and represent only the strongest linkages (weights above 10%). The strength of the linkages is indicated by the colors and thickness of the arrows.
An arrow pointing from country i to country j indicates the percentage of country i's foreign assets that is held in country j. To better compare weights over time, we x the position of countries to broadly mirror their geographic location.
A few ndings emerge from these gures:
The US is the main destinations of foreign investment, followed by the UK. Even though there are important intra-European and intra-Asian linkages, most arrows point towards the US and, to a smaller extent, the UK.
There are no dramatic changes on portfolio asset weights over time. The only noticeable change is the increase in the concentration of Asian and UK assets in the US from 1995 to
2005. This may be seen as tentative evidence against the decoupling hypothesis for Asian
EMEs, although a test of this hypothesis would require more careful analysis.
Financial Stocks
To take a closer look at nancial interlinkages, we go beyond portfolio weights and construct an alternative measure: the sum of the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities divided by the GDP of the source country.
where k denotes the asset class: all asset classes, FDI, equity, and debt. We do not report the network diagram for reserve assets due to the con dentiality of the data, but reserve assets are included in the ratio of total assets plus liabilities to GDP.
All asset classes
Figures 4 to 6 represent AL_G D P i jt for the total of all asset classes, in 1985, 1995, and 2005. Three patterns emerge from these gures:
There was a remarkable increase in the size of nancial positions from 1985 and 2005.
This can be seen by the larger number of arrows in gure 6 and the increase in the size of the linkages. This increase is particularly pronounced from 1995 to 2005 due to nancial globalization and is consistent with the evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) .
Foreign assets and liabilities are organized in three tiers of nancial centres: the rst tier includes the US, the UK, Hong Kong, and Singapore; the second tier includes France, Germany, Australia, Canada and Japan; and the third tier includes the remaining countries.
Strong link between China and Hong Kong. This is not surprising given the strong historical, administrative and political links between the two countries.
FDI
Figures 7 to 9 represent AL_G D P i jt for FDI in 1985 for FDI in , 1995 for FDI in , and 2005 . They con rm the large increase in foreign assets and liabilities, especially since 1995. FDI is organized in three clusters:
one cluster covers the Americas, including the US, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, but also includes some European countries like Spain and Portugal; another cluster covers Europe; and the third cluster covers Asia. The US and the UK are part of all three clusters, which re ects their systemic importance..
Equity
Figures 10 to 12 represent AL_G D P i jt for portfolio equity in 1985, 1995, and 2005 . The same trends emerge as for FDI, with a large increase in the size of nancial positions in the last two decades, specially since 1995. This increase is particularly concentrated around large nancial centres (US, UK, Singapore, and Hong Kong).
Debt
Looking at debt, gures 13 to 15 reveal that the US, UK, Singapore, Hong Kong, and also Japan emerge again as important nancial centres. In addition, there is some interesting time variation in the size of nancial linkages: 
Comparison with Trade
It is interesting to compare the geography of nancial linkages with the geography of trade linkages. Figure 16 shows the ratio of the sum of bilateral exports and imports to GDP in the source country in 2005. It can be compared with Figure 6 for nancial linkages. The key fact that emerges from this gure is that trade is organized in three clusters: an American cluster, centred on the US; an European cluster, centred on Germany; and an Asian cluster, centred on China and
Japan. This contrasts with the geography of nancial linkages, which are less intra-continental, but are organized in three tiers of nancial centres.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the understanding of nancial globalization by building a dataset of bilateral nancial positions for 18 countries, including developed economies and EMEs.
The rst tier includes the US, the UK, Hong Kong, and Singapore; the second tier includes
France, Germany, Australia, Canada and Japan; and the third tier includes the remaining countries. In contrast, trade linkages are more intra-continental and are organized in three clusters: an American cluster, centred on the US; an European cluster, centred on Germany; and an Asian cluster, centred on China and Japan.
While we have tried to use the best models to estimate missing data and have incorporated all possible information, for example using indices of nancial liberalization, there is still a health warning that needs to be made. The quality of some of the original data sources is questionable, as illustrated by the lack of symmetry between FDI assets and liabilities. Also, there may be important nancial linkages with countries that are not in our sample. For example, the sample does not include any offshore nancial centres. Since these typically operate as intermediaries and not as nal destinations for investment, our estimates will give an accurate description of nancial linkages to the extent that the allocation of investment through offshore nancial centres mirrors the allocation of investment that is not intermediated by these centres. To test whether this hypothesis is valid, we would need a more detailed treatment of the role of nancial centres. 
